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Seldom in the recent history of transatlantic trade negotiations has there been 
as much conceptual confusion as during the 2007 German EU Council 
presidency. While at first there was talk of a transatlantic free trade agreement, 
called TAFTA, in the course of early 2007 the goal became a barrier-free market 
between the two trade partners. What, concretely, does this mean for transat-
lantic trade, and what are the alternatives available to policymakers?
The 1990s were distinguished by numerous transatlantic initiatives, such as 
the Transatlantic Declaration (1990), the New Transatlantic Agenda (1995), 
and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (1998). Most recently, in 2005, 
the so-called EU-US Economic Initiative was called into existence at the EU-US 
summit meeting in Washington. The purpose of the initiative was the gradual 
elimination of the barriers in the transatlantic economic area. In consultation 
with the private sector and civil society, the 2005 initiative underscored the 
following core areas of closer transatlantic cooperation: promoting regulatory 
and standards cooperation; stimulating open and competitive capital markets; 
spurring innovation and the development of technology; protection of intellec-
tual property rights; investment; competition policy and enforcement; public 
procurement; and services.
The issue of divergences in regulation was considered by both sides to be the 
most important obstacle to transatlantic trade. A forum was therefore estab-
lished between the transatlantic regulatory agencies, called the US-EU high-
level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, with the goal of exchanging best practices 
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and suggesting new subjects for transatlantic regulatory cooperation. The 
group agreed to present an annual progress report at the EU-US summit meet-
ing. At the 2006 summit in Vienna, actors resolved to extend the initiative to 
additional areas.
The problem facing this agreement, as with previous agreements, is different 
political interests on both sides of the Atlantic in promoting integration in dif-
ficult areas. The United States, for example, is mainly interested in the strong 
protection of intellectual property rights whereas in discussions on regulatory 
issues US representatives like to point out that individual US states possess ex-
tensive powers and that numerous regulatory agencies are not subject to federal 
regulation. The lack of concrete results in this central area, however, has led to 
louder calls for visionary projects such as TAFTA or a transatlantic market.
Visions for the Future—TAFTA
The Transatlantic Free Trade Area is a seemingly visionary concept that regu-
larly surfaces in political discussions and the press. The idea is not new. In 
1995 then-German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel proposed a transatlantic free 
trade agreement. In 1998 the initiative was again taken up by then-EU Trade 
Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan. In both cases, however, it failed mainly because 
of the United States’ lack of political interest, although 
France was also reluctant. More recently, TAFTA has been 
placed on the agenda by a member of the German Bunde-
stag, Matthias Wissmann, and European parliamentarians 
Elmar Brok and Erika Mann. They hope to provide a “new 
vision” and a sustainable basis for transatlantic trade relations. Common values 
are to be established through TAFTA and a treaty superstructure created. Ad-
vocates often point to the increasing dominance of Asian states, especially 
China and India. The economic argument for TAFTA is that the European 
Union and the United States have already concluded numerous free trade agree-
ments with other parties, but not with one another, despite the fact that they 
are respectively each other’s most important trading partner.
Free trade agreements, by defintion, entail the elimination of tariff barriers 
and are considered the minimum level of economic integration. With the excep-
tion of high-tariff areas such as agriculture and textiles, however, the tariff bar-
riers in transatlantic trade, averaging four percent, are already quite low. The 
real constraints are found in the area of regulations and standards. Thus the 
advocates of TAFTA—though one would not suspect it from the name—are not 
interested in a pure free trade zone, but in a comprehensive agreement that, in 
addition to the removal of tariff barriers, would include technical standards, the 
integration of financial and capital markets, access to stock markets and their 
oversight, questions of antitrust and competition law, investment, environ-
ment, and energy policy, among others areas.
Long and complicated negotiations would be necessary to implement this 
plan. One must ask how progress could be possible on the bilateral level in the 
difficult areas of agriculture and services when the two parties failed to achieve 
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A union of the two largest 
trading partners in a free 
trade zone would be viewed 
negatively by third states.
it in the Doha Round of the WTO. There is also a real danger that a union of 
the two largest trading partners in a comprehensive free trade zone would be 
viewed negatively by third states in Asia and Latin America and could be inter-
preted as a retreat from the Doha Round. The German State Secretary from the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Bernd 
Pfaffenbach, thus described the initiative as a “kiss of 
death” for the Doha Round. EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson also reacted negatively to the initiative. He em-
phasized that TAFTA would send the wrong signal to the 
rest of the world and warned that no other EU country 
would support the idea. Mandelson later put this harsh assessment into per-
spective, explaining that the existing EU-US Economic Initiative could form a 
basis for the long-term idea of a free trade zone should both sides decide to 
pursue it in the future.
A Barrier-free Transatlantic Market
For these reasons the acronym TAFTA is now a taboo among experts. As an alter-
native, advocates now speak of a barrier-free transatlantic market. This project 
has been supported by Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the beginning of the German 
EU presidency, Merkel traveled to Washington to present her idea. In mid-January 
2007, in a speech before the European Parliament on the goals of Germany’s 
presidency, she declared, “At the EU-US summit we want to discuss the intensifi-
cation of the transatlantic economic partnership... In the interests of our global 
competitiveness we have to continue removing trade barriers, for example in pat-
ent law, industrial standards, or in access to stock markets. I am firmly convinced 
that a common transatlantic market is in Europe’s own best interests.”
At a summit in Washington on April 30, 2007, the European Union and the 
United States signed the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic In-
tegration. The focus of the framework agreement is the elimination of non-tariff 
trade barriers posed by regulations, for example norms and standards. In addi-
tion, the two sides agreed on so-called Lighthouse Priority Projects. These proj-
ects include: (1) the enhanced protection of intellectual property rights, (2) the 
development of common standards regarding trade security, (3) the mutual rec-
ognition of financial market regulations, (4) enhanced cooperation in innovation 
policies and technologies, and (5) the establishment of a regular dialog on invest-
ment barriers. In a first step, running until 2009, both sides intend to agree on 
commonly accepted accounting standards. In a second step, which is supposed to 
last until 2015, other areas should be included through mutual recognition, the 
harmonization of norms and standards, or the development of common rules in 
new fields. In this context, a permanent high-level Transatlantic Economic Coun-
cil was established to oversee the framework agreement projects, set goals and 
deadlines,  as well as issue semi-annual progress reports. EU Commissioner 
Günter Verheugen will be the chair of the Council together with Allan Hubbard, 
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National Eco-
nomic Council. The agreement’s goal is to set up structures similar to an internal 
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market. Thus the transatlantic market would exclusively include so-called “WTO 
plus” issues that are not dealt with as part of the Doha Round and would there-
fore avoid competition with the World Trade Organization.
From an economic point of view, these goals are welcome. However, one 
must ask why the United States would be more interested in implementing a 
barrier free transatlantic market than it has been in the current Economic Ini-
tiative, which deals with similar issues. The difficulties in the harmonization or 
mutual recognition of norms and standards remain the same. Without ener-
getic political support on both sides of the Atlantic, such a comprehensive proj-
ect is doomed to fail.
What is to be Done?
Germany has been attempting, within the scope of its EU presidency, to pro-
mote further transatlantic economic integration. This intention is reasonable, 
but it should be viewed as a long-term project. It is crucial that political interest 
in actually removing trade and investment barriers exists on both sides. This is 
not the case at present and therefore chances are that this initiative will also 
produce a meager outcome.
In order to facilitate transatlantic trade and investment it is crucial to make 
real progress, particularly on regulatory issues. Through small advances it may 
be possible to reach the longer-term goal of a barrier-free transatlantic market. 
Chancellor Merkel provided a clear vision for this at the April 30 summit: “So 
I am confident that with the Economic Council we have set up, we will be able 
to make progress on very concrete projects, for example, mutual recognition of 
standards and other areas. It is, as I see it, a significant step forward.” We can 
only hope that we do not lose sight of this vision once the summit is over and 
we are back dealing with day-to-day issues.
